Does borrowing at 400 percent APR do more harm than good? The Pentagon asserts that payday loans harm military readiness and successfully lobbied for a binding 36 percent APR cap on loans to military members and their families (effective October 1, 2007). But existing evidence on how access to high-interest debt affects borrower behavior is inconclusive. We use within-state variation in state lending laws and exogenous variation in the assignment of Air Force personnel to bases in different states to estimate the effect of payday loan access on personnel outcomes. We find significant average declines in overall job performance and retention and significant increases in severely poor readiness. These results provide some ammunition for the private optimality of the Pentagon's position. The welfare implications for military members are less clear-cut, but our results are consistent with the interpretation that payday loan access causes financial distress and severe misbehavior for relatively young, inexperienced, and financially unsophisticated airmen. Overall job performance declines are also concentrated in these groups, and several pieces of evidence suggest that these declines are welfare-reducing (and not the result of airmen optimally reducing effort given an expanded opportunity set); e.g., performance declines are larger in high unemployment areas with payday lending.
I. Introduction
loan access changes outside options for airmen. The three performance and readiness measures are arguably of greater interest to the Pentagon than reenlistment itself because the military (and the Air Force in particular) has been exceeding its reenlistment targets. 12 We find some evidence that payday loan access has adverse effects on job performance and readiness. Access significantly increases the likelihood that an airman is ineligible to reenlist by 1.1 percentage points (i.e., by 3.9 percent). We find a comparable decline in reenlistment. Payday loan access also significantly increases the likelihood that an airman is sanctioned for critically poor readiness (as measured by the presence of an unfavorable information file) by 0.2 percentage point (5.3 percent). These results provide some ammunition for the private optimality of the Pentagon's position.
Our data do not permit sharp tests of the welfare implications for military members, and in principle, the adverse effects we find could be the result of optimal shirking. 13 Airmen might optimally reduce on-the-job effort if payday loan access increases outside options in the civilian labor market and/or if borrowing enables them to avoid hazardous duty.
We explore optimal shirking hypotheses to the extent permitted by the available data and find little evidence of shirking. The reenlistment decline disappears if we condition on eligibility,
suggesting that payday loan access decreases reenlistment through job performance declines rather than voluntary separation. Unfavorable information files (UIFs) are created only for outcomes that are likely welfare-reducing: poor job performance, criminal behavior, and documented severe financial irresponsibility. We find no support for the alternative hypothesis that airmen intentionally use payday loans to get out of hazardous duty: the results are similar across occupations with different likelihoods of combat deployment, and the results actually seem to be driven by airmen in occupations where security clearance is not required for missions.
Moreover, UIFs significantly increase with payday loan access only among first-term (relatively young and inexperienced) airmen. The effects on reenlistment ineligibility are stronger for firstterm, low-clearance, and low financial sophistication occupations. Moreover, eligibility declines more in high unemployment areas (that presumably have fewer outside options).
Overall, our results suggest that payday loan access produces welfare-reducing declines in job 12 See http://www.defenselink.mil/ for several news releases and articles on reenlistment targets and successes for the different Armed Forces branches through the years. On the Air Force in particular see also Powers (2004) . 13 In practice it seems unlikely that even airmen who are seriously contemplating exiting the military would find it optimal to reduce effort to the point where they are sanctioned for critically poor readiness or deemed ineligible to reenlist, since poor job performance adversely affects the type of discharge and recommendations one can get from commanding officers, thereby adversely affecting civilian labor market options and veterans' benefits. See Section V-B for more details.
performance, financial distress, and/or severe misbehavior. The external validity of our findings to other branches of the military is likely high. The external validity for civilian populations is uncertain, for reasons we discuss in the Conclusion.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the payday loan product, market, and the prevalence of military borrowing. Section III describes state regulation of payday lending. Section IV describes the assignment of servicemen to bases in different locations.
Section V describes our measures of job performance and separation from the Air Force. Section VI details our empirical strategy and identifying assumptions. Section VII presents our main results. Section VIII concludes with a discussion of policy and welfare implications.
II. Payday Lending and the Military
In a standard payday loan contract the lender advances the borrower $100-$300 14 in return for a post-dated check, dated to coincide with the borrower's next paycheck, in the amount of $115-$345. The market rate is about $15 per $100 advanced (390 percent APR for a two-week loan), although fees as high as $30 per $100 are not uncommon. 15 Nearly all transactions are face-toface in retail outlets, although Internet lending is growing.
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The closest substitute for a payday loan is arguably overdraft protection on a bank account (Stegman 2007; Morgan and Strain 2008) . 17 The other expensive loan products labeled "predatory" by the Pentagon and consumer advocates require collateral (pawn, auto title, subprime home equity) or a durable purchase (rent-to-own), or are available only once a year (tax refund anticipation). 18 In some cases less expensive alternatives may be available on-base; the Department of Defense (2006) reports that the Air Force Aid Society provided an average of $800 in no-interest loans or grants to nearly 15,000 financial distress cases and also notes that "the banks and credit unions on military installations have begun to provide lending products that 14 Stegman (2007) estimates that 80 percent of payday loans are for $300 or less, and we draw much of the information in this section from his overview of the industry. See also Barr (2004) ; Caskey (1994; . 15 See Flannery and Samolyk (2005) , DeYoung and Phillips (2006) , and Skiba and Tobacman (2007) for evidence on competition, pricing, and profitability in the payday loan industry. 16 Stephens Inc. (2007) estimates that Internet payday lending is growing at 40 percent annually and comprised 12 percent of total volume in 2006. 17 Bouncing checks is quite costly due to legal ramifications and has negative effects on the credit score (CheckSys) banks use to screen applicants for a deposit account (Campbell, Martinez-Jerez and Tufano 2008) . With overdraft protection a bank pays overdrawn checks rather than returning them. In exchange the bank charges the account holder a $20 to $30 fee. Hence in many cases getting a payday loan is cheaper than overdrawing the checking account (particularly if the account holder runs the risk of overdrawing multiple checks). 18 The one exception is the relatively rare "military installment loan.. The Department of Defense (2006) reports that payday lending outlets outnumber military installment loan outlets by orders of magnitude. their youth, births, frequent moves, pay fluctuations from hazardous vs. non-hazardous assignments), and relatively reliant on credit to smooth consumption (due, e.g., to limited labor market options for spouses, geographic isolation from family members). On the supply side, military borrowers are relatively attractive credit risks: they offer a steady paycheck (the primary requirement for obtaining a payday loan) and may also face pressure (both implicit and explicit) from their employer to repay. Military borrowers are also concentrated geographically, which allows lenders to efficiently amortize the fixed costs of outlet operations.
As noted at the outset, the Pentagon is concerned that payday borrowing creates financial distress among rank-and-file personnel. The Pentagon holds that this financial distress creates 19 The Department of Defense (2006) 1995 -September 2001 . Column 2 describes the variation for our 23 We define a state as permitting payday lending if its laws do not prohibit the standard payday loan contract defined in Section II, for a loan of $100 of more. For most state-years classifying states this way is relatively straightforward. Our primary sources are the laws themselves (statutes, superseded statutes, and session laws). We then consulted several secondary sources to confirm that our readings of the laws were sensible. (2004; 2005; 2006; 2007) is an exception. Using these data our Appendix Table 3 shows the strong correlation between state legal authorization and store outlets per capita in our cross-section of states. We do not include state fixed effects because there are only six law changes during this sample period (12/31/03-7/1/06), four of which might not have affected state-level store counts because they did not apply statewide: they only authorized military command to place payday outlets off-limits to servicemen. Other reports note rapid and widespread lender entry and exit following law changes (Fox 1999; Reisdorph 2005; Graves 2007 The results show little evidence of any economically significant correlation between personnel AFQT scores and payday lending access laws. Across all terms (i.e., all airmen) only one of the seven correlations between an AFQT measure and the law variable is statistically significant, and this one implies only a 1 percent increase in the probability of being in the 31 st -49 th percentile of AFQT scores. We do find some statistically significant results for first-and second-term airmen, but none of these coefficients imply more than a 2 percent change in the outcome variable. Notably, the correlation between the law variable and the AFQT group mean (column 1) flips signs across first and second terms and is small in both cases: the coefficients each imply a less than one-half percent difference in AFQT scores across payday access regimes.
30 Lleras-Muney notes anecdotal evidence that higher-ranking, more experienced personnel may have a bit of influence over where they are assigned (Segal 1986; Croan, LeVine and Blankinship 1992) . This provides additional motivation for estimating our specifications separately by term of enlistment; see Section V for more details. 31 As we discuss in Section V, our data are grouped at the occupation by location by year by term level. We lack the demographic information used for exogeneity tests in previous studies.
V. Job Performance Measures
We use four different measures of job performance and retention as dependent variables. Table 2a contains summary statistics. Below we detail each of the four measures and then summarize how they might be affected by access to payday loans.
A. Background: Organization and Evaluation of Air Force Personnel
Enlisted personnel in the Air Force (a.k.a. "airmen") enlist under contracts for four-to six-year terms. After completing two enlistment terms an airmen becomes "career term. Supervisors continuously evaluate each airman's job performance. At a minimum, each airman receives an annual enlisted performance report (EPR). We do not have access to these reports but observe a summary measure of performance (reenlistment eligibility), and two measures of extremely bad performance/behavior: the presence of an unfavorable information file and forced enrollment in the weight management program.
B. Reenlistment Ineligibility
Reenlistment eligibility depends on satisfactory job performance and readiness. Airmen are automatically ineligible to reenlist if they engage in specific types of bad behavior, including if Of the 376,000 individual-year observations that we disaggregate from these data, 28 percent of airmen were ineligible to reenlist at the end of their term. Ineligibility is u-shaped in term.
First-term airmen are much more likely to be ineligible than second-term airmen (27 percent vs.
32 According to Air Force (2005b) Section 2.1, "The control roster is a rehabilitative tool for commanders to use. Commanders use the control roster to set up a 6-month observation period for individuals whose duty performance is substandard or who fail to meet or maintain Air Force standards of conduct, bearing, and integrity, on or off duty." 33 The unit commander typically is the squadron commander at the location of assignment. However, it is important to note that in recent years the military in general, and the Air Force in particular, has been meeting or exceeding reenlistment targets. For our purposes this suggests that the Pentagon is indeed concerned with first-order effects of payday borrowing on job performance, rather than with second-order effects that cause some marginal airmen to separate.
The Air Force has more than enough airmen to fill slots; it is concerned primarily with the quality of the airmen it retains.
Thus, for our purposes we are primarily interested in whether we find treatment effects of payday loan access on reenlistment ineligibility and separation that are significantly different from each other. For example, finding significant increases in separation but not ineligibility with payday loan access would be compelling evidence that payday loans increase outside options for airmen.
We measure separation from the same grouped data used to measure reenlistment ineligibility and find that 48 percent of airmen separate at the end of their term. Separation declines with term, from 62 percent at the end of the first term to 39 percent at the end of a career term. This pattern is due largely to the military retirement system that vests after twenty years of service. 37 For example, to be eligible for reenlistment after 10 years of active service an airman must have achieved the rank of E-6, technical sergeant, or higher. 38 Airmen are occasionally "administratively" discharged mid-term, usually for medical reasons or extremely poor performance/behavior. 39 Lt. Gen. Donald L. Peterson, quoted in Parr (2001, p.1) . 40 Economists have long pointed out that the military pay table does not adequately distinguish between occupational subgroups within the services (Rosen 1992; Asch 1993; Asch and Warner 2001) . The Pentagon has implemented occupation-specific bonuses and special payments to combat this problem.
D. Unfavorable Information File (UIF)
An unfavorable information file (UIF) is an "official repository of substantiated derogatory data concerning an Air Force member's personal conduct and duty performance" (Gittins and Davies 1996) . Mandatory entries in a UIF include records of: 1) Nonjudicial punishment suspensions greater than one month; 2) Civilian court convictions; and 3) Court martial convictions.
Additionally, commanders have the discretion to place other documented misbehavior in a UIF, including letters of reprimand, confirmed incidents of sexual harassment, less severe civilian court convictions and non-judicial punishment, and financial irresponsibility (Department of Defense 1984) . Thus an airmen with a UIF has been sanctioned for severe misbehavior and is presumed to have unusually poor job performance and/or readiness (Gittins and Davies 1996; Air Force 2005b ).
We are not aware of any evidence that payday borrowing itself produces UIFs. It is unlikely that a commanding officer would even be aware of an airman's borrowing unless it produced some sort of distress (e.g., declines in performance, requests for financial advice or help, or loan delinquencies). 41 Appendix Thus we interpret a UIF as an indicator of some combination of severe misbehavior and financial distress.
We measure UIF status from records grouped by three-digit occupation, base, fiscal year, and term of enlistment for fiscal years 1996 through 2007. 42 The data specify the total number of airmen in the group and the number with a UIF. We have data for different 141 occupations and 141,434 occupation-base-year-term cells.
Of the 2.4 million individual-year observations we disaggregate from these data, 3.6 percent have a UIF. UIFs decrease in term, with first-term airmen at 6.1 percent and career-term at 1.6
percent. We measure WMP status from records grouped by three-digit occupation, base, fiscal year, and term of enlistment for fiscal years 1996 through 2004. 44 The data specify total number of airmen in the group and the number participating in the WMP. We have data on 139 occupations and 103,776 occupation-base-year-term cells.
E. Weight Management Program (WMP)
Of the 1.8 million individual-year observations we disaggregate from this data, 2.2 percent are in the WMP. Second-term airmen are most likely (3.3 percent) and first-term least likely (1.8 percent).
F. Payday Borrowing, Performance, and Retention
As noted at the outset, the Pentagon asserts that payday borrowing impairs readiness and job performance by distracting airmen from their duties. There are at least two potential channels for such distractions. The one cited by the Pentagon is that payday borrowing causes financial distress and related distractions. Another possibility is that payday loan access increases the opportunity set for some households, e.g., by permitting liquidity constrained households to invest in side ventures, a spouse's job, etc. A larger opportunity set makes separation from the military a more viable option and might induce optimal shirking: a lower level of effort and job performance that is privately optimal for the airman.
VI. Data and Methodology
We estimate the causal effect of payday lending access on personnel outcomes by disaggregating the grouped data and estimating the following model using ordinary least squares (OLS): 45 Because our data are aggregated to occupation-location-year cells, as a robustness check we also estimate the model using weighted least squares with the grouped logistic transformation of the dependent variable suggested by Cox (1970) . Specifically, the dependent variable is computed as follows: log (p + 1/2n) -log 47 These control variables are summarized in Table 2b . γ is a base fixed effect that controls for any time-invariant level differences across bases that might be correlated with payday lending laws. Since airmen are assigned conditional on the manpower needs of the Air Force in a given year, we also condition on jte φ , the full set of occupation-year-term fixed effects. We cluster our standard errors at the state level to correct for potential serial error correlation at our level of variation in payday loan access: within states across years (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan
2004).
Thus, we use within-state variation in payday lending laws to estimate the causal effects of state laws permitting (or prohibiting) payday lending. As discussed in Section III it appears that (changes in) state laws do have very large effects (of perhaps 100 percent) on the penetration and hence availability of payday loan outlets. And as discussed in Section IV the exogenous variation in airman location (conditional on occupation*year*term) makes it unlikely that the error term contains omitted trends in the outcome that are correlated with changes in payday lending law.
Our estimates of the law effects-and hence the effects of payday loan access-are reducedform because we lack any data on borrowing, and we lack comprehensive data on lending locations. Hence knowing the prevalence of payday borrowing is key to interpreting the results.
As discussed in Section II it seems likely that 15-25 percent of military households used payday loans annually throughout most of our sample. But it is possible that prevalence was lower during the first few years of our sample, and we explore the implications of this in Section VII-A.
(1 -p + 1/2n), where p represents the proportion of individuals in the occupation-base-year cell who stay in the Air Force and n is the cell size. Results are qualitatively similar using this estimator. 46 We include the group's mean AFQT and the proportion below the 31 st percentile (an Air Force cutoff). Although exact income is not known for each individual, the military pay system makes imputation straightforward because income varies formulaically by rank, years of service, location, and in some cases occupation; see Carrell (2007) for details. 47 We use fair market rent for two-bedroom apartments (for the base's MSA or county) as published annually by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the county-level calendar year average annual unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Pentagon priors that young, inexperienced, relatively poor, and financially unsophisticated airman are particularly likely to exhibit negative effects from payday borrowing motivate estimating [1] on particular sub-samples as well as on the entire population of enlisted airmen.
Below we report results by term of enlistment (which is highly correlated with age, experience, and income) and occupation subgroups (that may be correlated with financial sophistication and risk exposure).
VII. Results

A. Average Effects of Acces, and Effects by Term of Enlistment
The first row of Table 3 presents our full sample results for each of the four personnel outcomes.
Each cell of the table presents an OLS estimate on the variable for whether state law permits payday lending (i.e., Payday st = 1) from equation (1).
48
Column 1 shows that reenlistment ineligibility (our measure of overall substandard job performance) increases by 1.1 percentage points with payday loan access (p=0.032). This is a 3.9 percent increase on the full sample mean of 0.28 reported in Table 2a . Column 2 shows that we find a comparable percentage point increase in separation (failure to reenlist). This pattern holds throughout Tables 3-6: the results suggest that any separation increases are driven by reenlistment ineligibility (and hence not by voluntary separation). But we do not have the power to distinguish small differences in treatment effects across the two outcomes. Column 5 shows that the point estimate on separation falls sharply, and becomes insignificant, if we condition on eligibility. This again is consistent with a payday loan access effect that works only through job performance and not through voluntary separation.
Column 3 shows that the likelihood of an unfavorable information file (UIF) increases by 0.19 percentage point with payday loan access (p=0.043). This is a 5.3 percent increase on the full sample mean. As discussed above we interpret UIFs as capturing some combination of financial distress and severe misbehavior.
Appendix Table 2 , Columns 4 and 5 suggest that the full sample effect on UIF is due at least in part to declines in job performance. Column 4 drops all cells from fiscal years [2005] [2006] [2007] because, beginning in January 2005, one of the two major payday lending trade associations (FISCA) prohibited its members from making collection calls to commanding officers. Column 5 drops cells from five states that forbid collection calls and moreover prohibited lending from outlets deemed off-limits to servicemen by commanding officers. In both cases we find that the 48 Appendix Table 5 shows results from different control variable specifications. point estimate on the effect of payday loan access actually increases slightly, contrary to what one would expect if the UIF effect was driven by purely by financial distress and dunning.
Returning to Table 3 , Column 4 shows an insignificant effect on weight management program status. The point estimate implies a 0.13 percentage point (5.9 percent) increase in airmen with weight problems.
Appendix Table 2 explores whether these effects have varied over time. Column 2 restricts the unfavorable information and weight management sample to the 1996-2001 fiscal years, to see if we find markedly different effects pre-9/11 (recall that our reenlistment data end in 2001 and hence are unaffected by this restriction). The point estimates are largely unchanged. Column 3 drops the first three years of our sample to explore whether lower borrowing prevalence in these years drives down our estimated effects (which are intention-to-treat effects). The point estimates suggest a different story: they fall instead of rise when the earlier years are dropped. The full sample results seem to be driven by the youngest and least experienced (i.e., the firstterm) airmen. Their likelihood of reenlistment ineligibility increases by 1.9 percentage points (7.0 percent) with payday loan access, with a p-value of 0.08. And their likelihood of an unfavorable information file increases by 0.34 percentage point (5.6 percent), again with a p-value of 0.08.
B. Heterogeneity: Access Effects by Term of Enlistment (Proxy for Age and Experience)
We find little evidence of significant effects in second-or career-terms. But these are not precise zeros, given the power limitations of using state-level variation. The confidence intervals contain substantial effects on both sides of zero in most cases.
C. Heterogeneity: Access Effects by Additional Proxies for Financial Sophistication
There are many reasons why the declines in job performance and readiness documented in Table   3 might be concentrated among first-term airmen. Among the most likely reasons are relatively high borrowing prevalence (which we do not observe directly) and lack of financial experience and hence financial sophistication. Table 4 explores the role of financial sophistication further by splitting the sample based on occupation characteristics. Again each cell of the table presents an OLS estimate on the variable for whether state law permits payday lending (i.e., Payday st = 1) from equation (1). Table 4 , Panel A splits the full sample into finance and acquisition (procurement) vs. other occupations. The latter constitute the bulk of the sample, and unsurprisingly, their results track the full sample closely. So our discussion focuses on the finance and acquisition sub-sample.
Airmen in these occupations presumably have greater financial acumen and/or experience and hence greater financial sophistication. Columns 1 and 2 show that these airmen do not exhibit significant increases in reenlistment ineligibility or separation with payday loan access; in fact the coefficients flip signs (suggesting that eligibility and retention increase with access), although the standard errors are far too large to conclude anything definitively. In contrast, the unfavorable information point estimate in Column 3 suggests an even larger increase for these financially sophisticated airmen than in the full sample (here of 0.35 percentage point, or 15 percent), although the p-value is only 0.154 given the small sub-sample. Table 4 , Panel B splits the full sample into above-and below-median AFQT score occupations. This split is likely a cruder proxy for financial sophistication, since the correlation between cognitive ability and financial sophistication may be weak (we are not aware of any direct evidence on this correlation), and there may be other sources of heterogeneity across occupations that is correlated with AFQT and drives the effects of payday loan access on our outcomes. We find similar effects across the high-and low-AFQT sub-samples except on weight management, where we find a large and significant increase only in the above-median AFQT sample.
D. Heterogeneity: Optimal Effort Reductions? Effects for Airmen with Different Risk Exposure
There is anecdotal evidence that airmen intentionally take on high debt loads to avoid hazardous duty. This suggests the hypothesis that the performance and readiness declines documented thus far might be the result of strategic, privately optimal responses by airmen to payday loan access. Table 6 provides another indirect test of the hypothesis that performance and readiness declines are due to effort reductions that are privately optimal for airmen. If this were the case, we might expect larger declines with payday loan access in areas where there is low civilian unemployment and hence greater outside options for servicemen and/or their spouses. In presenting the results we deviate from the format used in Tables 3-5 
E. Heterogeneity: Optimal Effort Reductions? Access Effects by a Proxy for Outside Options
F. From Access Effects to Effects on Borrowers: Implied Treatment-on-the-Treated Effects
Thus far we have focused on estimating the effects of payday loan access; i.e., we estimate the effects of payday loan availability on pooled samples of borrowers and non-borrowers. We do not have microdata on borrowing and hence cannot directly estimate effects on borrowers. A simple indirect way to estimate these treatment-on-the-treated effects is the Wald estimator: take our access estimates (i.e., our intention-to-treat effects) and divide by estimated borrowing prevalence (i.e., by treatment likelihood).
49 But the Wald estimator may be biased here for at least two reasons. One is negative spillovers, which seem plausible, especially in the military setting. If a borrower's performance decline adversely affects the performance of someone else (e.g., a squadron-mate), then the Wald estimator will overstate treatment-on-the-treated effects. A second reason is that the relevant horizon for measuring a treatment "dose" is unknown. Borrowing treatment effects may last longer or shorter than one year. Both of these reasons speak to the importance of gathering data on the borrowing behavior of servicemen for future research.
VIII. Conclusion
We estimate the effects of payday loan access on military readiness and performance using Air
Force personnel data, within-state variation in state lending laws, and exogenous variation in the assignment of personnel to bases in different states.
Overall the results provide ammunition for the Pentagon's concern that payday borrowing has adverse effects on military readiness. We find that payday loan access produces a significant decline in overall job performance (as measured by a 3.9 percent increase in reenlistment ineligibility), and a concomitant decline in retention. We also find that a measure of severely poor readiness (the presence of an unfavorable information file) increases by 5.3 percent.
The social welfare implications of our results are less clear-cut but suggest that the performance and readiness declines from payday loan access are welfare-reducing. Most of the negative effects of payday loan access on UIFs and reenlistment ineligibility seem to be driven by young, inexperienced, and financially unsophisticated airmen. The UIF effect likely stems from increases in outcomes that are truly bad for airmen as well as for the military as a whole: financial mismanagement (distress) and/or severe misbehavior. These outcomes may produce negative externalities as well.
The alternative hypothesis that the performance and readiness declines are the result of optimal effort reductions, from airmen enjoying expanded opportunity sets as the result of credit access, receives no support in the data. We find no evidence that effects on separation are due to anything other than reenlistment ineligibility (as opposed to voluntary separation). We find no evidence that the payday loan access effects are driven by airmen in relatively hazardous or high security-clearance occupations. Performance declines are significantly greater in high unemployment (i.e., presumably low outside option) areas that allow payday lending.
Questions about the external validity of our findings are important along several dimensions.
One is whether our treatment effects capture the most relevant policy margin at this juncture. Other differences between servicemen and civilians-in preferences, risks, or endowmentscould cut either way. Any differences in outside borrowing options would be particularly critical because even "behavioral" borrowers may be better off borrowing at 400 percent APR if they have less-regulated outside options that are even worse (e.g., loan sharks).
In any case, more work will be needed to identify the causal effects and welfare implications of access to expensive credit. In particular our results highlight the value of treatments that vary at the individual level, and thereby increase power, and the value of richer data. Baseline data would help identify the role of outside borrowing options and any behavioral biases. Borrowing data would help identify treatment duration and spillovers. Richer outcome data would help pin down mechanisms and welfare implications. 50 The federal law has applies broadly to all loan products and may also have differential enforcement (time will tell whether it is enforced more or less effectively than state laws). 51 For details see http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/PaydayLend_2008.htm and http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/PaydayLend_2007.htm . Beginning in 2005 five states passed laws prohibiting lending to military personnel if a commanding officer declared the payday lending premises offlimits; we code these cells as prohibited and report results after dropping these cells in Appendix Table 4 Column (5). Alabama and Arkansas are unusual due to litigation resulting in court decisions affecting the interpretation and enforcement of laws. We classify several state-year cells for Alabama and Arkansas based on the interaction of laws and court decisions interpreting those laws. We report results after dropping these cells in Appendix Table 4 , Column (6). 1996-2001 1996-2001 1996-2007^1996-2004^1996-2001 Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Observations are individual-year, disaggregated from grouped data. Data missing for 2003 fiscal year (October 2002 -September 2003 .
Personnel-specific controls include wage income and AFQT scores. Location-specific controls include annual fair market rent, annual unemployment rate, and the twice lagged number of military personnel in the state.
Each cell presents an OLS estimate of the variable for whether state law permits payday lending, following equation 1 in the text. October 2002 -September 2003 . All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3 : personnel and location-specific controls, occupation*year*term fixed effects, and base fixed effects. 1996-2001 1996-2001 1996-2007 1996-2004 1996-2001 1996-2001 (1) (2) High versus low unemployment is based on the sample mean unemployment rate (4.867%) for base/year cells from 1996-2007.
All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3 : personnel and location-specific controls, occupation*year*term fixed effects, and base fixed effects.
Appendix Motivation for sample restrictions:
(1) reproduces Table 3 row 1 for reference.
(2) pre-9/11; same timeframe for UIF and WMP outcomes as for reenlistment and separation outcomes. (3) drops earlier years because military borrowing prevalence might have been lower. (4) drops years in which many lenders adopted best practices including not contacting commanding officers for help with debt collection (6) drops cells from Alabama and Arkansas where we classify based on the interaction of court actions and the laws themselves.
(7) drops cells from Oklahoma when law specified minimum loan term of 60 days.
(9) drops cells from 3 states with loan databases that made restrictions on serial borrowing enforceable in later years.
All specifications include the same controls as in Stephens (2006 Stephens ( , 2007 ; three state-year cells are missing counts because a later report noted that an earlier count was mis-estimated but did not revise that count.
We do not include state fixed effects because there are only six law changes during this sample period, four of which might not have affected state-level store count because they did not apply statewide: they only authorized military command to place payday outlets off-limits.
(mean = 103, median = 100) Appendix All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3 : personnel and location-specific controls, occupation*year*term fixed effects, and base fixed effects.
AFQT category values: 1 for 0-30th percentile, 2 for 31-49th percentile, 3 for 50-64, 4, for 65-92, 5 for 93-100. Personnel-specific controls include wage income and AFQT scores. Location-specific controls include annual fair market rent, annual unemployment rate, twice-lagged number of military personnel in the state, and the following data for 2000 only: non-housing and utility price-level, per capita income, population, percent of the population in the Armed Forces, percent of the population in rental occupied housing, percent of the population in the same house 1995-2000, and demographic characteristics. These 2000-only controls drop out when base fixed effects are included.
